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ABSTRACT: Understanding the language of rejections and objections is an important part of the 
analysis and practice of argument. In order to strengthen this understanding, we might turn to 
diagramming, as it has been shown to have the virtue of improving critical thinking skills. This paper 
discusses what reliable meaning can be taken from words and phrases related to rejections and 
objections, and then how to diagram them. 
 






An argument in the pragma-dialectical tradition is an attempt to eliminate 
disagreement between interlocutors (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, & Snoeck 
Henkemans, 2010, p. 2; Snoeck Henkemans, 1992, p. 18). 
If (speaker) A says, "Dublin is the capital of the Irish Republic." and B says, "I 
agree.", the dialog starts with agreement and there is no cause for the presentation 
of reasons in favor of a standpoint or for replies to them. For an argument to take 
place, then, B must reject the averred proposition.1 If A responds with something 
like "Well, you're an idiot then (for not agreeing with what I say).", she would 
indicate her unwillingness to attempt to eliminate the disagreement. An argument 
thus also requires that A, in some sense of the word, accepts B's disagreement.  
"Rejection" is used here as a synonym for "disagreement" or perhaps better 
"non-agreement" with the standpoint. In analyzing the language of disagreement, I 
(attempt to) differentiate various forms of disagreement. "Objection" is reserved 
here for disagreement with A's reasons and reasoning.  
The other main section of my discussion concerns the diagramming (or 
mapping) of rejections and objections in the course of a dialog. My interest here is 
mainly pedagogical: diagramming has been shown to have the virtue of improving 
critical thinking skills (Harrell, 2011; Harrell, 2008; Kirschner et al., 2003; Twardy, 
2004; Van Gelder, 2001, 2003). However, diagramming is not extended to rejections 
and objections in most textbooks or in the literature on diagramming. (Appendix 1 
surveys the coverage of objections in a number of textbooks, focusing on those that 
are most popular and those from authors working in the pragma-dialectic and 
                                               
1 In what follows, A and B are the speakers; A is female, B is male. 
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informal logic tradition.) On the assumption that more diagramming will continue to 
be beneficial, I attempt this extension. 
A possible reason for the underdevelopment of diagramming is the difficulty 
involved. Dialectical reasoning involves two speakers, but diagrams traditionally do 
not demarcate who says what; they are concerned only with the propositions 
involved, placing them in various relationships to one another in a single diagram. 
For this reason, perhaps, in addition to diagramming we find separate tracking 
systems which interpret the utterances of speakers in terms of the moves made by 
their speakers and the level of their commitment to previously uttered propositions.  
I shall say a few more words about this matter at the start of section 3, but I 
shall put this problem to one side and attempt simply to give a diagramming system 
for rejection and objection without explicit attention to tracking the speakers' 
commitment to the standpoint(s). 
 
2. THE LANGUAGE OF REJECTION AND OBJECTION 
 
2.1 Rejections and counter-standpoints 
 
Speaker A asserts some standpoint. B's rejection of or disagreement with a 
standpoint, when taken seriously by A, is what begins the argumentation.  
B rejects A's standpoint by failing to agree with the standpoint proffered by 
A. A's endorsement is for some reason not sufficient. The mildest form of rejection is 
doubt. B might express doubt by saying "It is?", "Really?", "I doubt it.", "I am not 
convinced." A request for reasons such as "Why do you think that?" also expresses 
doubt. Doubt means that B has another belief(s), unexpressed and perhaps even 
unconscious, which makes B unwilling to accept the standpoint merely on the 
authority of A, though A is not firm in holding this counter-standpoint. In this sense, 
doubt indicates that B holds one or more beliefs that are incompatible (directly or 
indirectly) with A's standpoint.  
When, as is often the case, A has presented a standpoint along with a reason 
(before B speaks), expressions of doubt are unfortunately ambiguous between 
doubt of the standpoint and doubt of the reason. Compare: 
 
A: Warren Buffett is very rich. 
B: Are you sure? 
 
A: Warren Buffett is very rich - he is on the Forbes list of 
wealthiest Americans. 
B: Are you sure? 
 
In the latter case, B's doubt might apply to the standpoint and so imply that either 
the reason or the inference are also doubtful, or it might apply to the premise and so 
imply doubt of the standpoint (in which case it would be an objection in addition — 
see the next subsection). In unusual cases, perhaps if B is a student of logic, B might 
disagree with the reason or the inference and yet agree with the standpoint; in most 
cases, however, B will only go to the trouble of questioning the premise if he also 
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doubts the standpoint and it is incumbent upon those trained in logic to articulate 
their unusual combination of attitudes. 
The strongest form of rejection, dismissals such as "You've got to be 
kidding.", "Rubbish!", "No way!", "Bullshit!", or even abuse, such as the rhetorical 
question "Are you out of your tiny mind?", might suffer from this ambiguity too, but 
are more typically used concerning a standpoint, whether or not B agrees with the 
reason.  
When clearly directed at a standpoint, dismissals, like doubts, indicate 
disagreement and indicate that B has a counter-standpoint. This is also true of less 
strong rejections which we can call "denials" of a standpoint, such as "I don't believe 
it.", "I don't think so.", "I think you're wrong.", or simply "No!". 
A strong rejection (denial or dismissal) creates an expectation that an 
alternative standpoint or an objection (see the next section) will be articulated (and 
argued for). Indeed, B will often articulate his incompatible belief in the same breath 
as he indicates his disagreement. The incompatible belief is a counter-standpoint. 
Violation of this expectation is the cause of the frustration expressed by Palin 
in The Argument Clinic (at 2m 18s):  
 
Cleese: Look, if I argue with you, I must take up a contrary 
position. 
Palin:  But it isn't just saying "No, it isn't.". 
Cleese: Yes, it is. 
 
Palin expects that Cleese will either provide a counter-standpoint and give evidence 
for it, or will criticize Palin's argument. (In fact, in the sketch Palin has not yet given 
any reason for his standpoint and so an objection is impossible.) An expression of 
doubt, by contrast, invites A to give evidence in support of the standpoint, so that B 
can set aside whatever is worrying him. 
Depending on the topic of the standpoint, dismissal or denial, but not doubt, 
might indicate not only that B holds a counter-standpoint, but implicitly articulate 
what the counter-standpoint is. If the standpoint is "Warren Buffett is not rich." then 
the stronger forms of rejection indicate that B thinks he is rich. (Though of course, 
the argument could then concern itself with just how rich Buffett is, and the 
standpoints would move from being contradictories to contraries.) If the standpoint 
is "Today is Tuesday.", on the other hand, dismissal or denial does not articulate a 
counter-standpoint, since it is not obvious what day of the week B thinks it is.  
A counter-standpoint, in the terminology of pragma-dialectics, gives rise to a 
"mixed" argument: "the opponent does not merely cast doubt upon the argument, 
but adopts a standpoint of his own as well" (Snoeck Henkemans, 1992, p. 87 n. 14). 
Once a counter-standpoint is expressed, it becomes an object for discussion; A might 
ask for B's reasons for believing it, and B might offer them and perhaps think that a 
successful counter-argument will be a more effective rejection of A's original 
argument than criticizing it directly. (This issue — that B might support his own 







When A has given both a standpoint and a reason(s) for believing it, B can respond 
with an objection, which indicates the nature of B's criticism of what A has said. 
Objections typically indicate rejection of the standpoint but do not articulate a 
counter-standpoint.  
B's words might indicate only the type of objection merely formally (that is, B 
says only what type of objection he holds). One way that B can state the nature of his 
objection (without or before providing the substantive objection) is by using the 
language of argumentation and logic.  
"That inference is weak." or "That's not a valid argument." indicate 
dissatisfaction with the inference using language from logic. Less formal ways of 
stating that an inference is weak include "That doesn't follow.", "That's not much to 
go on." or "You'll need more than that to convince me.". 
Unfortunately, some of the vocabulary of logic used to state the forms of 
objection has entered into everyday English and lost its precision. "(Not) valid", for 
example, has come to be applied to propositions, and so can be ambiguous when A 
presents both a standpoint and a reason(s). At this time, "(not) valid" is applied to 
standpoints as much as if not more than to the inference. 
"That doesn't necessarily mean …" and "Not necessarily" are in somewhat 
better shape. A logician hearing "not necessarily" would think that the inference is 
being criticized and the standpoint rejected.2 However, "not necessarily." is 
sometimes used to me "The standpoint is not necessarily true." even in the absence 
of reasons from A. B might use it to be polite, indicating with "not necessarily" that 
A's standpoint is true in some or many cases before pointing out the exceptions. For 
example: 
 
A: A mother would never hurt her children. 
B: That's not necessarily true. Sometimes …  
 
This use means that "not necessarily" can suffer the ambiguity noted in 
connection with doubt. For example: 
 
A: A mother would never hurt her children. After all, they're her 
own flesh and blood. 
B: Not necessarily.  
 
Agreement with the reason(s) combined with disagreement with the standpoint 
indicate disagreement with the inference. Consider the following exchange:  
 
                                               
2
 It's an interesting question what B's attitude towards the standpoint is when he says, "the inference 
does not necessarily follow". Is he expressing weak rejection, a doubt or something like doubt? This 
phrase is properly used when A has asserted a universal proposition. When B objects to this, he is 
suggesting that the proposition be made less universal. Does this mean he disagrees with the 
proposition or agrees with it?! 
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A: Warren Buffett lives in a fairly regular house in Omaha, 
Nebraska. He isn't rich. 
B: That's true, but he could still be rich. 
 
B concedes the truth of the premise but expresses disagreement with the standpoint 
and so disagrees with the sufficiency of the premise. 
Some indicator phrases are designed to work like this, admitting the premise 
but doubting the inference and so the standpoint: "Even so, …", "And yet …", "Yeah, 
but …", and verbs and adverbs indicating concession, such as "I concede … but …", "I 
grant … but …", "Admittedly … but …". 
B need not entirely concede the truth of A's premise; he might concede only 
that it is not definitive or only partially relevant to the standpoint, with a phrase 
such as "That is important to keep in mind, but …" or "That's true sometimes, but ...". 
Consider the following example:3  
 
A: Large lectures are an efficient use of faculty. We should 
increase the number we offer and do away with some low-
enrollment courses. 
B: Efficiency is important, of course, and large lectures might be 
OK for some courses, but pedagogical concerns are more 
important …  
 
As another example, consider the following statement in response to 
improved national security being used to support warrantless wiretaps: 
 
B: But even though warrantless wiretaps contribute to the war on 
terror, they are not worth the invasion of privacy. 
 
Here, B concedes that the practice has a beneficial consequence, but asserts that it is 
has a negative consequence, and that the two are of unequal value. A and B, as well 
as the analyst, must then decide if one of the two is strong enough to carry secure a 
standpoint, and which.  
Practical arguments often involve speakers presenting competing reasons 
concerning an action, such as allowing students to use computers in class, or getting 
a dog:  
 
A: We should get a dog. A dog would be good company, and add to 
the security of the apartment.  
B: No we shouldn't. A dog would add expense and need to be 
walked two or three times a day, which would take time.  
 
I think one reason why recognizing objections and counter-standpoints is important 
for critical thinking is that they require us (as analysts or participants) to think 
                                               
3
 Based on an example from Nelson, 2011.  
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about the weight of competing reasons. These must be practiced alongside 
arguments involving definitive (all or nothing) considerations.  
To indicate an objection to a reason, B might respond by saying "Your 
premise is false.". As noted already, just saying "That's false." (without using 
"premise" or another words such as "reason") is ambiguous as between premise and 
standpoint. 
There are other phrases, not from the study of logic or argumentation, which 
can be used to indicate criticism of a premise, such as "You have your facts wrong." 
and "Actually, no.". As noted already concerning rejection, however, there is a risk of 
ambiguity with phrases which challenge the truth of a statement and so could be 
used as a challenge to either the standpoint (and thus to premise or inference) or to 
premise (and thus to the standpoint). The word "facts" in "You have your facts 
wrong.", or a word such as "evidence" or "data" might more strongly suggest the 
premise. 
The broad use of the language of argument means that instructors face a 
tricky task, pedagogically: we want to educate our students in the precise use of 
logical terminology but then, in having them deal with real-world argumentation, 
must educate them in the imprecise use of that terminology in everyday 
argumentation. 
Often, of course, the ambiguities are cleared up by whatever B says next or in 
the course of the dialog. But substantive propositions only help to eliminate 
ambiguity when speakers (ourselves or our students) have a firm grasp of the 
subject matter. The range of topics over which familiarity is widespread is 
decreasing, which means instructors must either use banal examples or educate 
students in topics that are not logic or critical thinking. 
 
3. DIAGRAMMING REJECTION AND OBJECTION 
 
3.1 Two types of argument tracking 
 
In the pragma-dialectic tradition, an argument is an attempt to eliminate 
disagreement. This perspective on argument as process has the salutary effect of 
forcing us, whether as participants in our own arguments or as third-party 
observers or "analysts", to pay close attention to phrases by which a speaker 
indicates her attitude toward the substantive propositions of the dialog, especially 
in the "confrontation" and "conclusion" stages. That is, attention is paid to phrases 
which indicate whether or not (and with what confidence), the speakers agree or 
disagree with the standpoint (and the rest of the propositions employed). Tracking 
these attitudes can be done both descriptively (as in Edmondson, 1981) and 
normatively (as in van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans, 2002). 
Theorists in pragma-dialectics also pay attention, separately, to the 
substantive propositions and their interrelations as these appear in what they call 
the "argumentation" stage.4 These are diagrammed in the manner familiar from the 
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 The terms for the stages come from van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans, 2002. 
Chapter 5 of van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, looks just like an argument 
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informal logic and critical thinking traditions, using numbered propositions and 
arrows and perhaps a few other symbols such as braces or the plus-sign. That is, 
they track the argument in the sense of the product, the set of propositions, the 
standpoint (conclusion) and the reasons (premises). 
Argumentation theorists thus employ two types of argument tracking and 
one might ask what the relationship between the two is. Tracking the commitments 
of the speakers is useful insofar as we want to make ourselves and our students 
better arguers in the sense of being more just towards our interlocutors by avoiding 
the use of fallacious and rhetorical ploys against them, such as shifting the burden of 
proof or imputing some unstated belief to them. Tracking the substantive 
propositions, on the other hand, is good because we might also learn from the 
speakers concerning the issue at hand.  
If both types of tracking are valuable, we might attempt to devise a method 
for doing both at once, or discuss the prospects for reading the dialectical moves off 
the argument diagram.5 But this is beyond the scope of this paper. In what follows, I 
consider only diagramming propositions and their relationships, and in particular, 
rejections and objections.  
No tradition pays much attention to objections. Many texts do not discuss 
objections at all and those that do often do so superficially. Coverage of 
diagramming rejections is practically non-existent. (Appendix 1 surveys the 
coverage of objections in representative textbooks; it doesn't bother with 
rejections.) As mentioned in the introduction, my concern here is pedagogical and 
there is evidence to suggest that diagramming improves critical thinking skills, and 
so I attempt to advance the state of the art.  
 
3.2 Diagramming indicators of rejection and objection 
 
Diagrams number substantive propositions and show relations between 
propositions by using the various arrows and symbols. The relationship of 
premise(s) to conclusion is usually represented by an arrow between them; this 
arrow represents what in English are the various premise-indicator and conclusion-
indicator words. Numbers represent the substantive propositions while arrows 
represent the structure of the reasoning.6 
There are various additions that might be used in order to diagram rejections 
and objections. I think we can get by, or certainly do a lot, with one addition, arrows 
                                                                                                                                            
diagram from critical thinking texts, containing only reasons in favor of a standpoint. The same is 
true of Walton, 2006, chapter 4; Walton is in the informal logic tradition, but includes pragma-
dialectic's rules for dialog. 
5
 We will see below that B's agreement with the truth of A's reason is not explicitly diagrammed. 
6
 Much attention has been given in the pragma-dialectical tradition to the distinction between 
dependent and independent premises and the indicator words which help distinguish them. See van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, chapter 7; Snoeck Henkemans, 1992, chapters 2, 3 and 4; van 
Eemeren et al., 1996, especially p. 18 n. 24; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002; 
van Eemeren, Houtlosser, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2010; Snoeck Henkemans, 2010. My own take on 




with a dashed shaft. Where an arrow with a solid shaft is read as "is reason for 
accepting", a dashed arrow can be read, in general, as "is reason for not accepting", 
and has two specific forms depending on what it points at: if it points at a number 
representing a proposition (whether premise or standpoint), it means "is a reason 
not to accept as true"; if at an inference arrow, it means "is a reason not to accept as 
sufficient". 7  
As mentioned in section 2, rejection indicator words, whether in the form of 
doubt, denial or dismissal, indicate B's disagreement and that he has some contrary 
or contradictory standpoint, not yet expressed and perhaps not even conscious. An 
indication of rejection or formal rejection can be diagrammed with a dashed-arrow 
pointed at the number representing the standpoint; as there is no substantive 
counter-standpoint, the arrow does not point from any number, as in figure 1: 
 
 
Figure 1: Disagreement with a standpoint without a substantive counter-standpoint. 
 
Formal disagreement with a standpoint implies that something is wrong with the 
initial argument. But since we do not know (yet) what the supposed fault is, we can 
diagram no further.8 
The device of an arrow not pointing from any number can also be used to 
represent indicators of objections to a premise or to an inference. If B implies 
disagreement with a standpoint by saying "your facts are wrong", we can diagram 
with two arrows, one against the premise and the other against the standpoint, and 
neither from a number. Formal objection to an inference would have the arrow 
point at the inference arrow and another at the standpoint. The reason for the two 
arrows in each case is that we should diagram whatever we can infer about B's 
position from what he says: criticism of A's premise or inference indicates 
disagreement of the standpoint.  
The unusual case of (the logic student's) agreement with a standpoint but 
(formal) disagreement with a premise would be diagrammed as in figure 2, using 
only one arrow: 
 
                                               
7
 The direction of the arrow represents whether the statement pointed from (directly or indirectly) 
supports or criticizes the initial standpoint: the reasons for the initial standpoint go in one direction 
(downward), objections go in another (upward). The use of two distinguishing features (the type of 
shaft and the direction) comes into its own when there are supports for objections and objections to 
objections, and support for support for objections, and so on. 
8
 We might perhaps diagram that there will be an objection of some type by using an objection arrow 
with a split head, but in practice it is a good idea when diagramming not to add arrows (or any other 




Figure 2: Objection to a premise without a substantive proposition. 
 
3.3 Diagramming substantive rejection and objection 
 
Where a counter-standpoint is articulated, that is, where a substantive proposition 
is presented as B's position, we would add a number to an arrow pointing at the 
original standpoint. Consider the following, in which a mixed response makes it 
clear that B is rejecting the standpoint:9 
 
A: Warren Buffett can't be very rich. He lives in Omaha, Nebraska. 
B: Even so, I think he is.  
 
"Even so" grants the truth of the premise and "I think he is." is a counter-standpoint, 
which is clear from the fact that it makes no sense, grammatically, as an objection to 
the premise. The fact that B articulates a counter-standpoint and agrees with the 
premise means that B must think A's inference is weak, even though no objection to 
it is articulated. We diagram both rejection and formal objection as follows, with a 
numberless arrow pointing at the "supports" arrow, as in figure 3:10  
 
 
Figure 3: Proposition (3) is a counter-standpoint; implied objection to the inference. 
 
As an example of substantive objection, let us return to Argument Clinic. 
Palin tries to convince Cleese that he (Palin) has paid by noting that Cleese is 
arguing and claiming "If you are arguing, I must have paid.". Cleese replies, "Not 
necessarily; I could be arguing in my spare time.". In figure 4, this reply is 
                                               
9
 Some reasons are clearly expressions of a counter-standpoint, even when that standpoint is not 
articulated, because of the obviousness of what can be inferred from them. For example: A: I think 
Jack has been out of town for a while — he hasn't responded to my e-mails or texts. B: But I saw him 
just yesterday! Here, B's utterance will provoke the counter-standpoint that Jack has been in town 
recently.  
10
 Note that no way of positively indicating B's agreement ("even so") with the premise is 
diagrammed. This is a basic function of an argumentation-tracking schema. Perhaps we could use an 
upward-pointing, solid arrow, from no number?  
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represented by the upward arrow against the standpoint ("Not necessarily") and the 
number 4 and an arrow from it for "I could be arguing in my spare time.".11  
 
 
Figure 4: Formal disagreement with a standpoint; proposition (4) is an objection to premise 
(1).  
 
The following dialog articulates an objection after the counter-standpoint: 
 
A: Warren Buffett can't be rich. He lives in Omaha, Nebraska. 
B: I think he is. Maybe he has family in Omaha. 
 
"I think he is." is an articulated counter-standpoint, represented by the number 3 
and its arrow. The second sentence of B's is best construed as a criticism of the 
inference, and diagrammed by 4 and an arrow pointing at the inference. The whole 
is diagrammed as in figure 5:  
 
 
Figure 5: Proposition (3) is a substantive counter-standpoint; proposition (4) is a 
substantive objection to the inference 
 
In this example, B's response is classified as an objection because it can be 
interpreted as an objection to the initial argument and would make no sense as a 
reason to think that Buffett is rich. (The "maybe" indicates that it is directed against 
the inference or an implicit connecting premise or warrant, as it is a general rather 
than a particular proposition about Buffett.)  
In the following example, the premise is challenged: 
 
A: Moving prisoners from Guantanamo to mainland U.S.A. puts 
American citizens at risk. They must remain at Guantanamo.  
B: No, they should be moved! The prisons they would be held in 
are super-max facilities that are completely secure. Indeed, the 
                                               
11
 The arrow points at a number rather than at the inference arrow because "If you are arguing, I 
must have paid." articulates the inference between the specific premise "You are arguing." and the 
conclusion "I paid.". The inference can then be criticized by criticizing this premise. 
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shoe-bomber and one of the 9/11 plotters are already securely 
incarcerated in U.S. prisons. 
 
Here, B begins with "No", which indicates rejection and immediately articulates his 
counter-standpoint. What follows this, however, is clearly contrary to the truth of 
A's premise, that Americans will be put at risk, rather than support for the counter-
standpoint.  
 
3.4 Dual-purpose propositions 
 
Could B's second sentence (about super-max facilities and their current occupants) 
also be interpreted as support for B's counter-standpoint? Perhaps not, because it 
would support the counter-standpoint only negatively, by removing a worry, as 
though A's initial reason were presented as an objection to B's standpoint.  
Some cases, however, are indeed ambiguous; that is, the same reason(s) 
functions both as support for a counter-standpoint and as a criticism of the initial 
argument. For example: 
 
A: Warren Buffett can't be very rich. He lives in Omaha, Nebraska. 
B: I think he is. He was towards the top of the Forbes 500 list. 
 
This reason provides support for the counter-standpoint. This supporting function 
can be diagrammed as in figure 6: 
 
 
Figure 6: Proposition (3) is a counter-standpoint; proposition (4) offers substantive support 
for (3). 
 
But the proposition which provides support for the counter-standpoint also serves 
as an objection to the original argument, and this role should be indicated in the 





Figure 7: As figure 6, with proposition (4) also serving as an objection to the initial 
inference.  
Similarly, consider an example in which speakers merely pile on competing 
considerations. Here is the discussion about getting a dog, again: 
 
A: We should get a dog. A dog would be good company, and add to 
the security of the apartment.  
B: No we shouldn't. A dog would be expensive.   
 
In this scenario, B's reason can be interpreted as support for his claim that they (A 
and B) should not get a dog. This is so because they immediately follow an 
expressed counter-standpoint. We would diagram as in figure 8:12 
 
 
Figure 8: Proposition (4) is a counter-standpoint; (5) supports (4). 
 
Without the presence of an articulated counter-standpoint, however, B's 
reason would be construed as an objection to A's argument (and specifically, the 
inference): that being good company and making the apartment more secure are 
insufficient support for A's standpoint. We would diagram as in figure 9: 
 
                                               
12
 Proposition 4 could be expressed as ~1. I ignore in this example the difference between 
descriptive claims and practical claims. For the split-tail arrow as a means of diagramming "piling-on 




Figure 9: Proposition (4), which is Figure 8's proposition (5), is an objection to the 
initial inference. 
 
In this diagram, the reason (here 4, which is the same proposition as 5 in the 
previous diagram) pushes back against the force of 2 and 3, rejecting 1. This 
proposition can be offered in support of the counter-standpoint or as a criticism of 
A's argument. This suggests that in the previous diagram we ought also to draw on 
objection-arrow from 5 to the shaft of the arrow from 1 and 2 to 3.  
B might even do both explicitly in one breath: 
 
A: We should get a dog. A dog would be good company, and add to 
the security of the apartment.  
B: No we shouldn't. A dog would be expensive. You seem to have 
overlooked this. 
 
In some cases, then, B's response can serve a dual function and this dual function 
can be diagrammed. (This goes for both speakers: the reasons A has already given in 
support of her standpoint can also function as rebuttals to B's argument.) These 
examples (both with single function and dual function) show again (as was stated at 
the end of section 2) that analysts must depend to some extent on their knowledge 
of the topic under discussion and cannot solely rely on indicator words and phrases. 
It is perhaps because of confusions resulting from the dual function of some 
propositions that most texts refrain from dealing with counter-propositions at the 
same time as the initial proposition. It is less confusing and makes for less dense 
diagrams to deal with one standpoint at a time and repeat the reasons in each 





Let me conclude by attempting to summarize the various claims made in the course 
of the paper.  
The second section of the paper discussed the words and phrases that can be 
used to express rejection and objection, and the extent to which they were reliable 
indicators. The following points were made: 
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 Snoeck Henkemans in chapter 4 of her 1992 diagrams A's reasons (both initial reasons and 
reasons offered in response to B's objections) without including B's objections.  
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 Doubt, denial and dismissal are three ways of rejecting a proffered 
standpoint without necessarily articulating it. A rejection is a 
contradictory stance, and wherever the options concerning the 
standpoint are limited to contradictories, the content of the counter-
standpoint can be known without it being stated explicitly.  
 In response to a standpoint along with a reason, indicators of 
disagreement with a proposition are ambiguous between the 
standpoint and the reason.  
 Rejections indicate counter-standpoints, but doubt does so very 
weakly; only with denials or dismissals is there an expectation that B 
should advance the conversation by giving an objection or support for 
a counter-standpoint. 
 Objections also serve the function of rejecting a standpoint. 
 Some of the language of objection from logic has been degraded in 
everyday English and is ambiguous between mere rejection and 
objection. This creates a pedagogical difficulty in that we must train 
students both in the precise use of this language and in its imprecise 
use, which is potentially confusing for students. 
 A mixed response can help specify the precise nature of B's response. 
 We can distinguish between formal and substantive rejection and 
objection, or to put in another way, between indicating and 
articulating rejection or objection. Indicator words and phrases are 
sometimes all that people say. 
 
The third section of the paper proceeds from a claim about the value of 
argument diagramming and assumes that this value extends to diagramming 
rejections and objections. In discussing how this might be done, the following points 
were made: 
 
 There are two types of argument tracking: tracking the speakers' 
commitments to the standpoint(s) and tracking the propositions. This 
paper does not attempt to integrate these. 
 The device of an arrow pointing from no number can be used to 
diagram rejection and objection that is indicated but not articulated, 
that is, to diagram indicator words. 
 Some substantive propositions can be categorized and diagrammed as 
objections alone, or as support alone, and some will have a dual 
purpose. Knowledge of the topic under discussion is essential in order 
to discriminate.  
 When a proposition both supports a counter-standpoint and functions 
as an objection to the initial argument, the diagram should reflect this 
dual function. 
 In the practice of diagramming is it advisable to diagram all of the 
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APPENDIX - Coverage of diagramming of objections in selected textbooks 
 
Austhink.com—against premise and against the inference in the form of a connecting premise 
Boss, Think, (2e 2012)—none 
Copi & Cohen, Introduction To Logic (8e 1990)—none 
Epstein, Critical Thinking (3e 2002)—against premise and against the conclusion 
Fogelin, Understanding Arguments (3e 1987)—none 
Howard-Snyder, The Power Of Logic (4e 2009)—none 
Kelley, The Art of Reasoning (3e 1998)—against premise and against the inference in the form of a 
connecting premise 
Johnson, Fundamentals of Reasoning (4e 2002)—none 
Johnson & Blair, Logical Self-Defense (1994)—none (mentioned in passing) 
Moore & Parker, Critical Thinking (6e 2001)—none (one example containing a consideration against 
the conclusion, diagrammed with hash-arrow) 
Morrow & Weston, A Workbook For Arguments, (2011)—none 
Thomas, Practical Reasoning In Natural Language (3e 1986)—against truth of premise, against 
inference 
Toulmin, Rieke & Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning—against inference 
Salmon, Introduction To Logic & Critical Thinking (5e 2007)—none 
Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation 
(2002)—none 
Walton, Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation (2006)—none 
Yanal, Basic Logic (1988)—none 
